Challeinges to Monetary Unification in the European Union: Sovereignty Reigning Supreme by Kurzmann, Brian K.
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 23 
Number 1 Fall Article 6 
May 2020 
Challeinges to Monetary Unification in the European Union: 
Sovereignty Reigning Supreme 
Brian K. Kurzmann 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Brian K. Kurzmann, Challeinges to Monetary Unification in the European Union: Sovereignty Reigning 
Supreme, 23 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 135 (1994). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For 
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
International Trade Section
Challenges to Monetary Unification in the
European Union: Sovereignty Reigning
Supreme?
BRIAN K. KURZMANN"
The effort to unify the currencies of Europe and establish a single
European Central Bank has advanced for nearly twenty years. The
most recent push toward monetary union,' embodied in the European
Economic Community's Maastricht Treaty,2 met unexpectedly acute
opposition, both in European courts and from European voters. The
focus of this opposition centered around concerns that currency unifi-
cation and the establishment of a European Central Bank would seri-
ously undermine the sovereignty of individual countries. Although the
Maastricht Treaty has now been ratified,3 its provisions concerning
* J.D., Ohio State University, 1994. The author is grateful to Professor Joanne
Wharton Murphy of the Ohio State University College of Law for making this article
possible.
1. Generally, a "monetary union" is a system of money common to two or more
independent countries. Such a union is characterized by a single currency issued by
a single central bank. The currency is legal tender in all the countries of the union.
See Joseph Gold, International Monetary Fund, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 403, 405 (1988).
2. Treaty on European Union, together with the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992). The twelve member
States of the European Union are France, Germany, Britain, Ireland, Italy, Belgium,
The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
The Maastricht Treaty, agreed to in December 1991, originally provided that
by 1996, member countries would determine which economies have met the criteria
for unification (inflation, interest rates, deficits, and currency stability), and that on
January 1, 1997, the complying countries would establish a single currency subject
to a two-thirds majority vote. Nancy Louise Kessler, Banking on Europe: 1992 and
EMU, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S395, S424-25 (1992). A single currency would be im-
plemented for those complying countries without a vote on Jan. 1, 1999 (the manda-
tory nature of Treaty). Further, it contained an opt-out clause for Britain. Id. at
S425.
3. The Maastricht Treaty went into effect on November 1, 1993, almost a year
late. National electorates and parliaments delayed ratifying the Treaty, with Germa-
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monetary union remain stalled and may never be implemented as
originally planned. Is monetary union in the European Union (E.U.)
viewed as an undesirable threat to the sovereignty of member coun-
tries or as a necessary step to help bolster that region's economy
against increasing global competition?4
This article examines the current monetary regime in the Europe-
an Union and analyzes the effect of recent legal and political challeng-
es to the attempt to bring about monetary union there. Part I briefly
examines the state of worldwide monetary arrangements and then
considers the forces that have led European nations to seek a union of
their currencies and central banks. Part II explores some basic as-
sumptions, as a matter of national and international law, underlying
worldwide monetary arrangements, and reviews the recent sover-
eignty-centered challenges to these assumptions in Europe. Finally,
Part III analyzes the effect of these challenges on Europe's effort to
bring about monetary union and considers the European experience as
a possible example for other monetary systems.
I. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND MONETARY INTEGRATION
A. National Sovereignty in Worldwide Monetary Arrangments
Every country is the sovereign of its own money.5 There is no
ny being the last country to accept it. Craig R. Whitney, With European Union's
Arrival, Fears on Economy Cast a Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1993, at Al.
4. Tremors of this new, fierce economy have unsettled some very stable curren-
cies. In the summer of 1993, Britain and Italy felt compelled, due to speculative
pressures on their currencies, to take the pound sterling and the lira out of the
European Monetary System. "[A] new, brutally competitive world economic order is
emerging with the demise of the cold war. The forces that are propelling this new
order will persist for years and promise to make life toughter for almost every-
one . . . ." Christopher Farrell, et al., What's Wrong? Why the Industrialized Nations
Are Stalled, Bus. WK., Aug. 2, 1993, at 55. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
Global currency exchange arrangements play a central role. As early as 1981,
French President Francois Mitterand observed that "[t]here is a currency war ....
Today, it is every man for himself. [Maintenance of high interest rates] exacerbates
already dangerous movements of capital .... Since each nation is undergoing a
crisis, they all tend toward egotism. Each country first wants to rescue itself, where-
as they will only be rescued together." Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft Interna-
tional Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INTL L. 443, 478 n. 98 (1981),
quoting TIME, Oct. 19, 1981, at 57.
5. The Permanent Court of International Justice has stated that "it is indeed a
generally accepted principle that a state is entitled to regulate its own currency."
Serbian and Brazilian Loans Case, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 20, 21, at 44. Furthermore,
the United Nations Charter considers the governance of money to be a matter of
domestic, not international, law. See F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 461
(5th ed. 1992). Thus, international law recognizes that it is within the sovereign
power of a country to take actions such as defining its own currency, deciding
whether to peg the currency to gold or some other commodity, depreciating or appre-
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central authority that regulates all exchanges of currencies or imposes
uniform monetary policy on all countries.' Yet the international com-
munity has a vital interest in maintaining a smoothly functioning
currency exchange regime,7 and in keeping stable the value of one
currency against another. Thus, there is tension, inherent in the sheer
multiplicity of currencies, between national sovereignty over money
and international interests.8 As B.J. Cohen said,
[slo long as there are politically sovereign states and formally inde-
pendent national currencies, there will be international monetary
problems.9
Over the years, various treaty arrangements have sought to re-
lieve some of these problems. The Bretton Woods System, established
in 1945, pegged currencies to one another by requiring the central
banks of member countries to keep the values of their currencies with-
in a prescribed range.10 This system called for a voluntary transfer of
a certain degree of monetary policy-making and currency exchange au-
thority to the International Monetary Fund, the principal organization
regulating exchange arrangements.1
In the years following the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in
1971, member countries of the International Monetary Fund were free
to choose, loosely speaking, whatever exchange arrangements they
ciating the currency's value, imposing exchange controls, and entering into treaties
with other States regarding any of these questions. Id.
Despite "obsolete and extravagant" attempts to limit sovereignty over money,
it is a firmly established principle. Id. at 463. One such attempt was a refusal in
1688 by the Chief Judge of England to give effect to the depreciation of the
Portugese currency, on the view that the Portugese king could not diminish the
value of the property of an English subject. Another attempt was a letter of protest
sent in 1800 by John Marshall, then American Secretary of State, to the
governement of Spain, complaining of Spain's devaluation of its currency. See Id. at
462.
6. See RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON, JOHN A. SPANOGLE, Jr.,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS NUTSHELL 118 (1992) [hereinafter FOLSOM].
7. See J.R. Artus & A.D. Crockett, National Sovereignty and International Coop-
eration over Exchange Arrangements, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 327, 328 (1980).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 327, quoting B.J. COHEN, ORGANIZING THE WORLD'S MONEY: THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS 273 (1977).
10. The Bretton Woods system was introduced after World War II. See KENNETH
W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM 71, 175 (1982). Under the Articles of Agreement to the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), member countries ceded a basic power to the IMF: the
requirement that the IMF concur with their individual currency devaluations. Id. at
92. However, the IMF was limited by national sovereignty from interfering with the
economic policies of member countries. Id. at 169.
11. The International Monetary Fund is the organization most lawyers and
economists think of as the world's currency regulator. It is an international organi-
zation created by a treaty, the Articles of Agreement to the IMF. Id. at 71.
1994
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liked. 2 A system of free-floating exchange rates, in which the foreign
exchange market was allowed to set the rates, came to predominate. 3
An important rule that continued to bind national monetary policy-
making in this looser regime, however, was that members could not
intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to "manipulate" the
international value of their currencies.
14
Despite this arrangement, which continues today, the sources of
conflict between national monetary sovereignty and the interests of the
international community persist. It is an axiom of economics that the
goals of capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, and national monetary
sovereignty are mutually unachievable. 5 Flexible exchange rate sys-
tems inevitably lead to the risk of volatility in exchange rates and the
existence of persistent misalignments of currency values. This in-
creases the pressure on central banks to intervene in the market to
manipulate currency values for national interests.
Seeking to minimize even these problems, economic and political
leaders have argued for the implementation of a monetary system in-
volving policy coordination among the chief industrialized nations,
combined with exchange rate management "of a degree that has until
now proved elusive." 6 The European Union has taken steps to make
this elusive goal a reality. Part II of this article further explores these
steps. The following section identifies several common assumptions
underlying monetary integration efforts.
12. Id.
13. There are three predominant exchange rate regimes among convertible cur-
rencies: 1) pegged or quasi-pegged arrangements; 2) managed flexibility; and 3) full
flexibility. Dominick Salvatore, The International Monetary System: A Transatlantic
View, ITAL. J. 29, 29 (1990). Managed or fully-flexible systems predominate in four-
fifths of the world. Id. at 29-30.
14. Artus & Crockett, supra note 7, at 332. See generally, Stephen Zamora, Sir
Joseph Gold and the Development of International Monetary Law, 23 INT'L LAW.
1009, 1014-1019 (1989) (tracing the development of international monetary law after
the collapse of the Bretton Woods System).
15. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Efficiency, Stability, and Equity: A Strategy for the
Evolution of the Economic System of the European Community, 1987 (report of
committe chaired by the author), cited in JOHN B. GOODMAN, MONETARY SOVEREIGN-
TY: THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN WESTERN EUROPE 202 (1992). This obser-
vation has elsewhere been expressed as "the incompatibility of free trade, full capital
mobility, fixed exchange rates, and national autonomy." Maxwell J. Fry, Monetary
Policy Implementation During Europe's Transition to a Single Currency, in EUROPEAN
BANKING 44, 48 (Andy Mullineux, ed., 1992) [hereinafter Mullineux], quoting H.
Ungerer et al., The European Monetary System: Developments and Perspectives, in
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER 73 (1990).
16. Salvatore, supra note 13, at 29.
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B. Legal and Political Assumptions Underlying Monetary Integration
The process of monetary integration can involve either policy
coordination among sovereign nations, on the one hand, or total con-
solidation of central banks and currencies, on the other. Whatever
level of integration is sought, certain assumptions that relate to the
principle of national monetary sovereignty can be identified. These pre-
mises are as follows: 1) that the setting of monetary policy should
remain as independent as possible from political influences; 2) that
monetary sovereignty should yield over time to centralized authority
as economies become more interdependent; and 3) that there is popular
support for monetary integration.
The leaders of the European Union seek to bring about total mon-
etary union by the year 1999 through the implementation of the con-
troversial Maastricht Treaty. The three assumptions underlying mone-
tary union have, consequently, seen legal and political challenges in
the E.U., startling many observers and perhaps even stonewalling the
idea of a single European currency and central bank.
1. The Need to Keep Politics Divorced from Monetary Policy-
Making
Most countries have a hierarchy of organizations that determine
and implement national monetary policy. The top level is a govern-
ment entity, usually a ministry of finance or treasury department,
which sets the outlines of monetary policy based on political consider-
ations. At a lower level is a central bank, usually owned and operated
by the national government, that is responsible for filling in the details
of monetary policy. 7 It is generally agreed that the decisions made by
a central bank should be as independent as possible from political
oversight." The more independent the central bank, the less political
factors - such as the timing of elections, the identity of the party in
control of government, and pressure from interest groups - influence
monetary policy. 9
One common example of how politics influences monetary policy
may be observed around election time.20 Politicians seeking reelection
may want to have interest rates lowered to please voters. To achieve
this, the politicians would require their subservient central bank to
17. FoLsoM, supra note 6, at 124.
18. Scholars have postulated that "economic conditions affect electoral outcomes
and, therefore, that governments attempt to manipulate the economy in order to win
elections. Voters are assumed to be myopic. [This gives] governments an incentive to
stimulate the economy prior to an election." GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 212.
19. Id. at 3-5.
20. Aside from reelection concerns, variations in the level of influence over
central bankers held by different political parties and labor militancy may also
influence monetary policy-making. Id. at 213-14.
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expand the supply of money. The voting public would enjoy the lower
interest rates right up to the election. Thereafter, however, inflation,
the nemesis of any central bank,21 would set in.'
[Ploliticians tend to be far less willing than central bankers to
subordinate other goals, such as growth and employment, to the
fight against inflation."
Practical limitations are also at work. The type of currency ex-
change system in effect largely determines the importance of the inde-
pendence of monetary policy-setting. If a country's currency is part of a
pegged exchange regime, monetary policy cannot have a great impact
because the exchange rate is determined by external controls, making
the degree of political independence of the central bank largely irrele-
vant. Very generally, this was the case under the Bretton Woods Sys-
tem. On the other hand, if a country's currency is part of a flexible ex-
change regime, such as the one that currently predominates, the inde-
pendence of monetary policy-making is relevant, and political indepen-
dence is considered much more important.24 Under flexible rates, cen-
tral bank intervention is discretionary.' Thus, a flexible system plac-
es a premium on the avoidance of political entanglements.
Monetary policy-setting is never totally detached from politics,26
and a measure of political control may even be desirable.27 One of the
best illustrations of advantageous political involvement in monetery
policy-setting is the German unification. In 1989, West Germany's
overriding political objective was unification with East Germany, and
the first step to achieve this was the agreement allowing all East Ger-
mans to exchange their GDR marks for FRG marks, thereby establish-
ing a common currency.' West (and East) German monetary policy
was set by politicians. Political control is also considered desirable in
21. Charles Goodhart, A European Central Bank, in EUROPEAN BANKING 12, 24-
25 (Andy Mullineux ed., 1992).
22. This example is often cited as the most common way that the money supply
is manipulated for political gain. See, e.g., WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEM-
PLE 67 (1987) (describing the Federal Reserve's "pump priming" of the U.S. economy
just prior to the re-election of President Nixon in 1972).
23. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 7.
24. It is generally agreed among the two predominant schools of economics,
Monetarism and Keynesianism, that monetary policy is ineffective in the long run.
However, it is also agreed that it can make a difference in the short run. Id. at 15.
25. Id. at 16.
26. See id. at 4.
27. The prominent economist Milton Friedman has explained that a politically
independent central bank, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve, is incapable of learning
from its own mistakes. Deepak Lal, Alternative Roads to Economic Integration: The
Case for Currency Competition in European Integration, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
299, 306 (1990).
28. Daniel J. Meandor, Transition in the German Legal Order: East Back to
West, 1990-91, 15 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REv. 283, 285 (1992).
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wartime, when immediate concerns over financing the victory effort by
expanding the money supply take precedence over long-term inflation-
ary concerns.'
While central bank independence therefore appears to be a gener-
ally desirable objective, it is largely irrelevant for countries whose
currencies are pegged. Independence is also curtailed when important
short-term goals must be placed ahead of long-term ones. Absent such
immediate concerns, however, independence currently remains the aim
among nations in the floating exchange regime.
2. The Inevitability of Diluted Monetary Sovereignty
While the politically independent policy-making is still valued, it
is thought to be losing its relevance amidst an increasingly complex
global economy.
The integration of the world's capital markets, driven by a combi-
nation of technological change and financial innovation, has in-
creasingly constrained the ability of central banks to set and imple-
ment their own monetary policies.'
Some observers have concluded that a critical balance has already
been reached between "national sovereignty and international legal
regulation" in currency exchange arrangements.31 After the collapse of
the Bretton Woods System, the United States and several other coun-
tries successfully argued that the soundness of domestic economic
policies should be the main concern of governments,32 and thus "ex-
change rates should be allowed to change freely to accord with changes
in the international position of a country."' Free-floating exchange
rates would provide greater opportunity for autonomous decision-mak-
ing in the sphere of domestic monetary policy.3'
As greater economic integration sweeps the world, the concern
that a proliferation of currencies can lead to economic crisis has led
other observers to conclude that a greater level of monetary integration
is necessary." As trade between economies grows, so does competition
29. See GREIDER, supra note 22, at 98-104.
30. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 5.
31. Gold, supra note 4, at 444. The author of this work is a former General
Counsel of the International Monetary Fund.
32. Id. at 450.
33. Id. at 451.
34. Id. at 451. The current Articles of the International Monetary Fund contain
many provisions that are not firmly binding on its members, and therefore do not
demand wholesale transfers of monetary sovereignty. Id. at 454.
35. For example, after the American Revolution, a devaluation of state bills of
credit occurred. This led to Shays' Rebellion in Massachussetts, in which debtors and
farmers demanded that the state legislature print and issue more paper money than
could be used to pay their existing debts. The Rebellion focused attention on the
1994
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and the desire for predictability in the value of money. To preserve
stability in currency values, closer coordination between monetary
policy-makers is thought necessary.3" It is this closer coordination
between countries that is seen as leading toward an inevitable depri-
vation of national sovereignty over money. "The transfer of functions to
a monetary union involves the corresponding decline of the powers of
the [countries] who become its consituent members."37
In other words, while the status quo may be regarded as preserv-
ing an equilibrium between monetary sovereignty and international
interests, economic interdependence is increasing. An unavoidable
companion of this quickening change is the weakening of national
autonomy over decisions about currency exchange rates and monetary
policy.
3. The Perception of Popular Support for Monetary Integration
It is sometimes claimed by political leaders that no matter what
type of monetary arrangement a country utilizes, it is an arrangement
that was democratically determined and enjoys broad popular support.
Although this claim does not necessarily relate to monetary sovereign-
ty per se, it does express an assumption of democratic values when
fundamental changes in monetary arrangements, such as currency
unification, are considered.
While popular support for monetary integration is impossible to
quantify precisely, a rough estimate can be gained through looking at
a variety of indicators: 1) electoral evidence of the level of support for
monetary integration; 2) skepticism about the democratic basis of the
integration efforts; and 3) current downturns in the local economy and
the reemergence of nationalism. These indicators bear relevance in
examining the current European effort to achieve monetary union, and
will be explored below.
II. THE EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT MONETARY UNION IN EUROPE
Before exploring how the three assumptions of monetary union
have come under attack in Europe, it is useful to examine the path
that the European Union has taken in seeking monetary union, and to
need for monetary uniformity in the new American republic. State Attempts to Tax
Sales of Gold Coin and Bullion in the United States: The Constitutional Implications,
5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 297, 302 (1982). In Federalist 44, Madison argued that
without a prohibition on the issuance of state currencies, competition between state
currencies would have a disuniting effect, and the new nation would lose foreign
credibility. See id. at 304.
36. Salvatore, supra note 13, at 29. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the importance of currency stability in a common market such as
the European Union.
37. MANN, supra note 5, at 508-09.
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look at where the E.U. is headed with the Maastricht Treaty.
A. The European Monetary System
Part and parcel of the European Union's establishment of a single
common market' is its interest in maintaining currency stability
among its members." The European Monetary System is the institu-
tion that was designed to achieve this.40 It is the second of three
phases of monetary cooperation that have existed in Europe since the
collapse of the Bretton Woods System.4' The third and final phase,
European Monetary Union, remains to be implemented pursuant to
the Maastricht Treaty.
The current phase, the European Monetary System, can be techni-
cally described as "an agreement among central banks to manage
intracommunity exchange rates and to finance exchange market inter-
ventions."42 It has two independent mechanisms for maintaining cur-
rency stability: the parity grid and the divergence indicator. The parity
grid measures the behavior of one member country's currency against
another's. To do this, the desired exchange rate of each currency is set
against every other currency by agreement. These bilateral rates serve
as reference points for fluctuating daily market rates, establishing the
upper and lower limits within which market rates are allowed to move.
Member countries' central banks are required to intervene to keep
their currencies within these pre-set bands,4" and the countries have
38. By the mid-1980's, the member countries of the European Union considered
the establishment of a new, more sweeping monetary regime essential to their na-
tional economic objectives. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 182.
39. "Establishment of a common market involves removal of obstacles to the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital." DAVID M. BARNARD, The Evolving
Pace of Regulation of the Financial Services Industry in the European Community,
Jan. 14-15, 1993, § 2.1(b), INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKET 1993: CORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES (1993).
Exchange-rate instability has adverse effects on intra-European capital
movements and monetary integration. If foreign exchange rates fluctuate
by more than 20% or 30%, investment becomes uncertain and uncompet-
itive, with the adverse result of reduced output and fewer jobs in affect-
ed industries. Pressure could grow for protectionism, which would jeop-
ardize the liberalization of trade in goods and services. Currency stabili-
ty, on the other hand, fosters price stability.
John H. Works, Jr., The European Currency Unit: The Increasing Significance of the
European Monetary System's Currency Cocktail, 41 BUS. LAW. 483 n.4 (1986).
40. See GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 183.
41. The first phase, the European Exchange Rate Agreement, existed from 1972
to 1979. Id. at 182.
42. Id. at 192.
43. To do this, the central bank whose currency is near the top of its range
against another currency must sell its overvalued currency and buy the undervalued
one, in order to decrease the value of its own money. The opposite is true for the
central bank whose currency is near the bottom of its range; it must buy its own
currency and sell the other. Works, supra note 39, at 493-94.
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a duty to see that the parities between their currencies remain rela-
tively fixed. The system is thus a type of pegged exchange arrange-
ment.
The divergence indicator, on the other hand, is designed to pro-
vide a measure of the behavior of one country's currency against the
weighted average of all the other currencies. This weighted average is
the well-known European Currency Unit (ECU)," which itself is
sometimes inaccurately portrayed as a currency. In fact, it is not legal
tender; it is merely a unit of account "containing a specific amount of
[each ofi the ... European currencies."45 If an exchange rate imbal-
ance shows up under the divergence indicator,
[r]ather than two currencies being at fault, as in the grid system,
one country only is to blame for the ECU divergence, and the re-
sponsibility of adjustment is place entirely on it."
Participation in both the parity grid and the divergence indicator is
ultimately voluntary.47
It is apparent that when currencies in this system are not exces-
sively strained by market pressures, the parity grid and the divergence
indicator keep monetary policies in line with E.U. goals. Yet these two
devices have proven to be inadequate when overpowering market
forces put the integrity of one country's currency at stake. In 1992,
Britain and Italy felt compelled to remove their currencies from the
European Monetary System entirely." Because of the voluntariness of
the current exchange regime, and the instability that it has brought,
E.U. leaders have wanted to make the requirements of harmonious
monetary policy-making and exchange rate stability firmly binding on
all member countries.
EMS rules allow the central banks to buy or sell other European Union
member currencies before the limits of their bilateral bands have been reached (al-
though this action must first receive the approval of the central bank whose currecy
is so affected), and intervention in non-EC currencies is always allowed without prior
approval. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 193.
44. "The ECU ... is used as a benchmark against which official exchange-rate
parities are set, as a measure of the overall strength or weakness of a currency
against the average of the rest, and as the unit of account for interventtion, credit
support, and settlement between the monetary authorities of the member states."
Works, supra note 39, at 484.
45. Id. at 494.
46. Id. at 495.
47. So ruled the European Court of Justice in Schlfiter v. Hauptzollamt lAbrrach,
[1973] E.C.R. 1135, 1161.




B. The Maastricht Treaty and the Leap Toward Monetary Union
The treaties that created the European Union did not originally
envisage a common monetary institution.49 Yet the leaders of the
E.U., in an effort to eliminate remaining transactional frictions, have
sought in recent years to achieve a full unification of currencies, called
European Monetary Union (EMU).' The last step toward this union
is the monetary integration provided for in the Maastricht Treaty.
Maastricht sets three goals for the establishment of a new monetary
regime: 1) creation of a single European Central Bank; 2) implementa-
tion of uniform foreign exchange policies; and 3) creation of a single
currency.5 EMU would be mandatory for all E.U. members.
The single European Central Bank (ECB) called for in Maastricht
would set monetary policy for the entire E.U., and "would be empow-
ered to enforce binding rules on national budgets."52 The Bank would
be independent of national governments and even E.U. authorities."
Individual central banks would continue to exist in a European System
of Central Banks, which would be comprised of the main ECB and the
national central banks together.5' Individual countries' central banks
would not be eliminated, but would become subordinate to, and func-
49. The Treaty of Rome, which established the E.U., did not create or envision a
supranational monetary institution. Articles 104 and 107 of that treaty laid down
the general requirement that member countries should maintain equilibrium in
balance of payments and should give due regard to each others' exchange rates.
Additions to the Treaty, such as the Single Euorpean Act, still did no more than set
forth general policy statements to be followed. See MANN, supra note 5, at 501.
50. The stages leading to EMU are as follows: 1) Close coordination of economic
policies of member states; 2) Beginning January 1, 1994, the prohibition of any
restriction on the movement of capital and payments, not only among member states
but also between states and third-party states, restrictions on government deficits,
the gradual establishment of the independence of each state's central bank (Arts.
109b and 108 of the EC Treaty), and treatment of exchange rate policy by each
state as a matter of common interest (Art. 109m, para. 1); 3) Beginning January 1,
1999, at the latest, adoption of a single monetary policy and a single exchange rate
policy. See GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 202-08.
51. Id. at 182.
52. Id. at 203. Fiscal controls are thought to be a necessary part of EMU's
integrated scheme because of the ripple effect that deficit spending in one country
could have on the other countries. In general, a government that over-borrows to
finance a budget deficit faces higher interest rates and a fall in the value of its
currency. But under EMU, E.U. countries will have none of their own currencies to
support. Consequently, an over-borrowing government would have no concern over
the possibility of a rise in domestic interest rates. Instead, any interest rate in-
creases from unilateral deficit spending will be spread out over the whole E.U. See
Shades of Sovereignty, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 1990, at 69.
53. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 204.
54. David Folkerts-Landau & Peter M. Garber, The ECB: A Bank or a Monetary
Policy Rule?, in ESTABLISHING A CENTRAL BANK: ISSUES IN EUROPE AND LESSONS
FROM THE U.S., 103 n.1 (Matthew B. Canzoneri, Vittorio Grilli & Paul R. Masson
eds. 1992).
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tionaries of, the central bank of the E.U.
Maastricht's single currency would be the ECU, which would
evolve from its present form as a unit of account to having the full
status of legal tender. The E.U.'s Council of Ministers, acting pursuant
to the unanimous vote of the member countries, would be empowered
to take all necessary steps to introduce the ECU as the sole currency,
and would have the power to establish ECU exchange rate arrange-
ments with other currencies.55 At least one non-member of the Euro-
pean Union, Sweden, has expressed its confidence in the ECU as legal
tender by pegging its currency to it.5
EMU is thus intended to have the practical characteristics of a
single currency, brought on and maintained by common monetary and
exchange rate policies set by the ECB. With national central banks
giving up "their right to formulate independent national monetary poli-
cies,"57 however, serious concerns have arisen over the priority of na-
tional economic interests and the loss of national sovereignty.' These
concerns pattern the assumptions of monetary integration examined
above.
III. LEGAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN MONETARY
INTEGRATION
A. Questioning the Need to Keep Politics Divorced From Monetary
Policy-Making
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, the particular
objective of each central bank of the European Union depended not on
the goals of the E.U. but on "the relationship between the central bank
and the [individual] government."5" Some central banks are almost
totally independent, while others are far more controlled. Notwith-
standing the E.U.'s aim of creating a single central bank unbridled by
political influences, the reality is that central bank independence has
remained a contentious issue. Although the cost on a E.U. member of
pursuing monetary policies divergent from those of the E.U. has ris-
en, pressures against separating politics from monetary policy have
also emerged. The real question is, should the ECB remain as politi-
cally independent from the E.U. and the currencies of the member
countries as the central banks of the member countries are now?
55. Art. 9; see 826-27.
56. Robert Taylor, Sweden and the EC; Sweden Comes in from the Cold, FIN.
TIMES, June 14, 1991, § 1, at 21.
57. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 204, quoting Karl Otto Pohl, Two Monetary Un-
ions-the Bundesbank's View, Speech to the Institute for Economic Affairs, London,
July 2, 1990.
58. See id. at 219.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id. at 183.
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A paradigm for the political independence of the ECB has been
the German central bank, the Bundesbank. One of the most indepen-
dent central banks in the world," it wields more control over its own
domestic monetary policy than any other central bank in Europe. 2
The Bundesbank also exerts enormous influence on the central banks
of other E.U. members.' With the example of the Bundesbank in
mind, some central bankers have accepted that the future ECB should
also be politically independent." Independence from political influenc-
es has been built into the proposed statutes of the ECB," and now
that Frankfurt, home of the Bundesbank, has also been chosen for the
home of the ECB, political independence in European monetary policy-
making is virtually assured.'
Yet the hope for a politically independent ECB has done little to
divert the attention of the existing central banks from their chief con-
cern: their domestic economies. A recent refusal by the Bundesbank "to
lower its discount rate one more time ... underscores the unwilling-
ness of European countries to sacrifice national economic interests for
the good of all Europe." 7 When the Bundesbank has considered the
monetary policy of the E.U., "it has done so largely to investigate the
impact of external economic factors on German inflation.' 8 The
Bundesbank is not a friend of European Monetary Union:
[It] has played the role of leading dissident over the establishment
of a single European currency .... The Bundesbank stands to lose
everything if Maastricht is implemented as planned .... It man-
aged to set the admission criteria for nations wanting to join a
single currency so high as to be almost impossible to fulfill.'
61. See generally id.
62. Other important European central banks enjoy far less independence. The
Banque de France, for example, is fully dependent on the government; it is effective-
ly an agent of the French Finance Ministry. Id. at 104. This dependence in France
prevented the emergence of a powerful internal opponent to the government's
growth-oriented strategy. Id. at 139.
63. One economist has observed that the current European Monetary System is
essentially "'an agreement by France and Italy to accept German leadership in
monetary policy, imposing constraints on [their] domestic monetary and fiscal pol-
icies.'- Id. at 195-96.
64. See, e.g., Lamont Says UK Accepts Independent EC Central Bank, REUTERS,
Nov. 21, 1991.
65. Nieck Ammerlaan, Frankfurt.Based EMI to Inherit Bundesbank Policies,
REUTER EuR. Bus. REP., Oct. 29, 1993.
66. Id.
67. Lawrence Ingrassia & Peter Gumbel, Changing the Rules: Europe's Money
Move May Pave Way to Rise in the Global Economy, WALL ST. J., August 2, 1993,
at Al.
68. Peter Gumbel, Germany's Neighbors Are Bridling At Its Apparent Inward
Turning, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1993, at A10. German inflation, brought on by the
high costs of German unification, has repeatedly been cited as the single biggest
factor in causing the ERM to buckle.
69. Id.
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Top central bank officials in Europe have criticized the Maastricht
Treaty on the grounds that it should do more to bring about political
union in the E.U., ostensibly to ensure that the ECB remains indepen-
dent from member country politics.70 But political union would mean
the loss of all national control over monetary policy. Many politicians
resist giving up control over their monetary policy, because that would
leave them powerless to use monetary policy to achieve domestic
goals." There is evidence that some politicians are happy with the
status quo, or are at least retreating from full-fledged support for ced-
ing further political controls over monetary policy to the E.U.72 Since
the choice of the currency exchange regime has great influence on
whether independent monetary policy-making can have effectiveness
domestically, and offers political gains, politicians have wanted to
retain that choice. Politicians worry that once a single currency is es-
tablished, they will lose their power to devalue their own currencies,
power which has often been used to increase exports and curb trade
deficits.7 3
The operation of market forces has called the value of ECB inde-
pendence into question. In the wake of turmoil in the European cur-
rency markets during the summer of 1993,74 there are renewed
doubts about the effectiveness of politically independent monetary poli-
cy-making. In the 1993 devaluations, small changes in perceived ex-
change rate risk caused massive currency shifts, and the market re-
sponse overwhelmed the ability of the central banks to intervene as
required.76 Two governments felt compelled to withdraw their curren-
cies from the European Monetary System in an effort to reduce the
strain on their central banks, which had been required to repurchase
vast quantities of their own money. The biggest threat to effective ECB
policy-making appears, somewhat ironically, to be the demonstrated
fragility of fixed exchange rates.
70. Id.
71. For a discussion of how monetary policy is ineffective in a system of fixed
exchange rates, see supra note 24; see also, Goodhart, supra note 21, at 24-27.
72. See infra note 102. As to capitalizing on favorable economic conditions,
European politicians do not, on one view, have a direct interest in shaping monetary
policy. The "dates of elections in many European countries are not fixed, govern-
ments are able to call early elections so as to take advantage of existing economic
expansions." Thus, while politicians may not care about creating monetary expan-
sions themselves, there is still an incentive for using expansions for political gain.
GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 212.
73. Frederick Painton, Cold Feet on the Dance Floor: With Britain Joining
Europe's Monetary Club, the Partners may Squabble even Louder about how closely
to Embrace one Another, TIME, Oct. 22, 1990, at 55.
74. The predetermined bands in which currencies were allowed to fluctuate had
to be widened as a result of massive devaluations. See Michael Sesit, Currency
Markets Cool Despite Loosened ERM, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 993, at C1.
75. Fry, supra note 15, at 48.
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While the proposed independence of the ECB is generally en-
dorsed by central banks, the same central banks do not have a vested
interest in implementing that independence. Central banks, politicians,
and even the marketplace remain focused on the performance and
well-being of domestic affairs. This will make it difficult to divorce
national concerns from monetary policy-making throughout the E.U. as
planned under Maastricht.
B. Legal Challenges to the Dilution of National Monetary Sovereignty
While the issue of central bank independence at the national level
centers around the question of who should control the formation of
monetary policy, the same issue at the European level centers around
the effort to preserve national monetary sovereignty.76 Maastricht
calls for an unprecedented shift of sovereignty in monetary affairs
away from national central banks and even from governments.77 How
realistic is the concern that monetary union threatens the integrity of
national sovereignty, and what has been the effect of this concern?
Unquestionably, members of the European Union have gradually
lost their autonomy over monetary policy as the Union has grown, 8
but, as seen above, "each government has still wished to keep for itself
some margin of policy flexibility."7" Current discussions of EMU often
do not characterize it as a union of money at all. EMU is described as
a system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates involving a common mone-
tary policy. The proposed common currency is said, under this
characterization, not to be essential to this system, but is instead
merely a natural and desirable further development. This latter expla-
nation does not bypass concerns about the surrender of monetary sov-
ereignty; it merely rephrases the issue.' The principal architect of
European economic and political integration, European Union Presi-
dent Jacques Delors, makes no secret of his view that "[a] high degree
of supra-nationality, or transfer of sovereignty to the [Union], is essen-
tial."8 '
As a consequence of the concern surrounding sovereignty loss,
legal challenges have been mounted against further unification of
Europe's currencies. In Germany, twenty separate lawsuits were
brought to the German high court82 by right and left wing elements of
76. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 207-08.
77. Id. at 182-83.
78. Penny-Marie Kartos, Note, Sweden-Application for European Community
Membership-Sweden Fears Loss of Political Neutrality with Community Membership,
22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 673 (1992).
79. GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 183; see Salvatore, supra note 13, at 32.
80. MANN, supra note 5, at 16, n.69.
81. Quoted in John Ardagh, Will the New Europe Please Sit Down, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1991, at A42.
82. German Supreme Court Approves Maastricht Treaty, THE REUTER EUROPEAN
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German politics. These suits claimed that Germany's constitution,
which declares that all of the country's power emanates from the peo-
ple, prevents the government from transferring a significant amount of
monetary authority to the E.U." In its decision, the court approved
the German ratification of Maastrichts' but with important reserva-
tions. According to the court, each further step toward EMU must be
monitored and approved by the German government, with the court re-
serving for itself the right to review each step to ensure that the demo-
cratic guidelines of the German constitution are observed.' Most sig-
nificantly, the court's decision affirmed the principle of sovereignty
over the process of monetary integration, up to and including the right
to withdraw from the EMU at any time.
The judgment of the German high court cuts the heart out of the
effort to make monetary integration "irreversible."8 As one prominent
observer professor concluded from this decision,
I doubt whether many of us will ever live to see the [Deutschmark]
replaced by the ECU. After this decision, Europe will never become
a super-state. The constitutional court will always remain our final
guardian in what has turned out to be a preventive ruling. 7
At the least, the decision places a cloud over further steps to bring
Maastricht into force. At worst, it will lead to a permanent judicial
veto over German accession to EMU.
Similar constitutional challenges were brought in France and
Denmark. The French constitutional court decided its case by ruling
that Maastricht's monetary unification provisions are contrary to the
French constitution." It analyzed the objective of EMU 9 and con-
cluded that
COMMUNITY REPORT, Oct. 12, 1993.
83. Christopher Wolf & Klaus Kohler, Currency Crisis Means New Ills for
Maastricht, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 6, 1993, at S14. The conservatives essentially argued
that Maastricht would undermine German sovereignty, while the liberals claimed
that the Treaty did not establish enough control over the unelected branches of the
European Union, the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Id. For a discussion
of the Democracy Deficit in the European Union, see infra note 115.
84. The decision was handed down on Tuesday, October 12, 1993.
85. The thrust of the argument advanced in the lawsuits was that Maastricht
violated the provision in the German constitution stating that "[aill state power
emanates from the people." Wolf & Kohler, supra note 83.
86. Timothy Garton Ash, Foreign Focus: Today Even the Germans are Euro-
skeptical, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 24, 1993, at 22.
87. Id.
88. See Juliane B. Kokott, Treaty on European Union is contrary to French
Consitution- amendments to Constitution-national sovereignty, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 824
(1992) (noting Decision No. 92-308 DC. 1992 Journal Officiel de la Republique
Francaise 5354, Conseil constitutionnel, April 9, 1992).
89. Embodied in art. B and G of Maastricht and art. 2 of the EC Treaty.
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it follows from the provisions applicable from the start of the third
stage of the economic and monetary union that the accomplishment
of such an objective shall be brought about by a single monetary
and a single exchange rate policy under circumstances such as to
deprive a Member State of its powers in an area where the essen-
tial conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty are in-
volved.'
After this decision, the French National Assembly adopted the neces-
sary amendments to the French Constitution to remove this flaw, and
ratification of Maastricht was narrowly approved." A suit was filed in
Denmark as well,' despite Danish approval of Maastricht in a second
referendum after Denmark was exempted from monetary unification.
This shows that the same constitutional concerns cross many borders.
Finally, Britain nearly saw its own constitutional challenge. Lord
Rees-Mogg, a prominent actor in financial circles, had considered
bringing a challenge against Maastricht in the Appeal Court, again on
the grounds of its inconsistency with national sovereignty. He changed
his mind only after the fierce currency speculation in the summer of
1993 caused the ERM to lose stability, diluting the sovereignty threats
he saw.93 The Bank of England has expressed similar doubts about
the validity under the English constitution of the transfer of ownership
of foreign reserve assets to the European Central Bank. The Bank of
England believes it is sufficient if each central bank agrees to make
available a predetermined amount of its own reserves for the disposal
of the ECB, but that no further decision-making authority be trans-
ferred.'
Despite such challenges within their own jurisdictions, E.U. law
obligates member countries to facilitate the achievement of E.U. objec-
90. Kokott, supra note 88, at 827 (noting Decision No. 92-308 DC. 1992 Journal
Officiel de la Republique Francaise 5354, Conseil constitutionnel, April 9, 1992). Spe-
cifically, the French court held the following provisions to be contrary to the French
Constitution: Art. B of Maastricht (insofar as it provides for the establishment of an
economic and monetary union); Art. G of the EC Treaty (insofar as the requirement
of irrevocably fixed exchange rates is inserted into it); Arts. 105 para. 2, 105a, 107,
109 (referring to the European Central Bank and to the European Central Bank
System); and Arts. 109g, 1091 para. 4 (establishing an irrevocably fixed value of the
ECU and irrevocably fixing exchange rates between member countries). See id.
91. Id. at 828.
92. See Maastricht Sail On, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 1993, at 15.
93. Britain OK's European Union Treaty, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 1993, at 13. For a
description of the dynamics of recent speculative attacks on the weaker currencies in
the ERM, see John S. Suits, To Save the European Union, Create New ERM, Minus
Mark, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 6, 1993, at A18. In 1992, Britain and Italy
pulled out of the EMS, also due to speculative pressures. This resulted in the mar-
gin of fluctuation in the divergence indicator being raised from 2.25 percent to 15
percent, meaning that currencies could lose as much as 15 percent of their previous
value relative to the strongest currencies in the system.
94. Goodhart, supra note 21, at 17.
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tives, including the implementation of EMU.95 For now, the members
remain free to alter their exchange rates." Given the serious legal
impediments to Maastricht now in place in Germany, a country that is
an indispensible player in European monetary integration, it is quite
likely that the .legal challenges against Maastricht's monetary union
provisions have put off monetary union indefinitely.
C. Challenges to the Perception of a Popular Support for Monetary
Integration
The legal challenges to currency unification question whether
there are constitutional limits on the transfer of sovereign powers of
monetary decision-making. Concurrent challenges posed by shifting
political attitudes question whether sovereignty should be relinquished
for reasons of national pride, apprehension, or skepticism, and whether
Maastricht actually represents the wishes of Europeans.
1. Electoral Evidence of the Level of Support for Monetary
Union.
While the governments of most members of the European Union
have officially supported the creation of a single currency,97 many
mainstream leaders, notably former British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher," Jacques Chirac in France, and the Social Democrats in
Germany, have taken positions opposed to further monetary integra-
tion.99 Even parties that previously gave their full support to mone-
95. Article. 5, e.g. , emphasizes loyalty and solidarity among member states.
96. Cases before the European Court of Justice confirm this view. In Compagnie
d'Appprovisionnement de Transport et de Credit S.A. v. Commission, Joined Cases 9
and 11/71, 1972 E.C.R. 391, 406, C.M.L.R. 529, the court held that "Jilt is clear from
Article 107 that it is for each Member State to decide upon any alteration in the
rate of exchange of its currency under the conditions laid down by that provision."
1972 E.C.R. at 406. See Works, supra note 39.
97. Stephen George, European Community, in THE OXFORD COMPANION To
POLITICS OF THE WORLD 285, 287 (1993).
98. Before leaving office, Thatcher denounced the "specter of a 'European super-
state, exercising a new dominance from Brussels." GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 207
n.59
99. Kevin Muehring, EMU's Bitter Medicine - Tough Rules May Discourage Mem-
bership, INST'L INVESTOR, April 30, 1992, at 37. The Social Democrats in Germany
later softened their position into an insistence for an opt-out provision similar to
Britain's. Former Bundesbank President Karl Otto Poehl agreed in principle with
Margaret Thatcher about the loss of sovereignty, but he did think that monetary
union should be implemented when all member States in the E.U. were capable of
fixing their exchange rates. Randall Mikkelsen, Poehl Says Thatcher was Right on
Monetary Union, REUTER LIBRARY REP., Nov. 30, 1990.
Concerns of politicians about sovereignty loss in monetary policy-making have
been expressed before. During negotiations of amendments to the articles of the
International Monetary Fund, spokesmen for the U.S. administration said that they
did not want "supranational government" running the U.S. economy, and that there
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tary union have significantly toned down their enthusiasm."° Voters
are of the opinion that if they put a different political party in office,
the successor government will, at least initially, seek as much autono-
my from international constraints as possible.'"
European electorates have shown a consistent level of opposition
to further monetary union. In Denmark, Maastricht was originally
rejected in a referendum, a rejection viewed as the embodiment of
fears over the loss of national self-determination. 2 Only after Den-
mark successfully negotiated exemptions from some of Maastricht's
provisions, including the currency unification requirement, did Danish
voters accept the Treaty in a second referendum.' 3 The Danish expe-
rience brought the debate about the efficacy of monetary union to the
forefront of European politics, where it has remained. Not long thereaf-
ter, French voters similarly came close to rejecting the Maastricht
Treaty.'O'
To Germans, the loss of their beloved Deutschmark to the ECU
implies higher inflation."° This feeling is a "common culture in the
general orientation of the economy," said Hans Tietmeyer, now
Bundesbank President, who is warmer to the idea of EMU than his
predecessor Helmut Schlesinger, but who is not likely to sacrifice the
stability of the mark for it."° The Social Democratic Party could, ac-
cording to one German politician, lead the rallying cry for anti-EMU,
pro-Deutschmark in the 1994 federal elections."° A recent poll
showed that only 50% of Germans supported Maastricht, and that 70%
believed that the Deutschmark cannot be replaced with the ECU.'"
The political risks of Maastricht at the hands of voters are best
exemplified in Britain. There, voters have expressed sustained criti-
cism, even outrage, over the behavior of their political leaders toward
should be no "substantial limitation on the sovereign right of nations to determine
their policies." Gold, supra note 4, at 459.
100. See, e.g., Tyler Marshall, In Germany, One of Unity's Biggest Backers Backs
Off, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at A3 (describing the German Christian Democratic
Party's toning down of support for European integration, but adding that the party
still fully supports monetary integration in principle).
101. Gold, supra note 4, at 478.
102. Hilary Barnes, The Edinburgh Summit: Danish "No" Voters Start to Wobble,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at 3.
103. See Alan Riding, Unity for Europe Survives Key Test as the Danes Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1993, at Al.
104. See id.
105. Muehring, supra note 99, at 37. A social psychologist even speculated that
abandonment of the Deutschmark might deprive Germans of their identity to the
degree that it would affect their behavior unpredictably. Id.
106. Watcher on the Main, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1993, at 80.
107. See Ash, supra note 86.
108. Marcus Kabel, German Court Approves Maastricht, Bonn Pleased, REUrTER
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORT, Oct. 12, 1993.
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monetary union. Prime Minister John Major gambled his political
career when he supported Maastricht. Continued opposition in Parlia-
ment, echoing the original concerns of Margaret Thatcher, nearly cost
Major his position. More recently, the Prime Minister has significantly
changed his stance on monetary union. He now believes that "the
[E.U.] will remain a union of sovereign states. That is what its people
want: To take decisions through their own parliaments.""°
In France, polls show that a clear majority would now vote to
reject Maastricht, and only a third of the people now believe that
France can benefit further from continued European integration. °
Insistence on monetary union is also giving pause to countries that
have been considering entry into the European Union and have other-
wise shown confidence in the E.U.'s goals. Austria, Sweden, Finland,
and Norway began negotiating their entry into the E.U. in 1993."'
Swedish opposition to their country's membership has grown since
then. Swedes share a concern that E.U. membership will endanger
their unique welfare state."2
The short-term political future paints an uncertain picture for the
Maastricht Treaty. Voters in Europe, especially in this recession, are
increasingly electing political fringes that share a resentment for fur-
ther European integration. A French observer foresees an unholy alli-
ance between the extremes of the right and left, united to oppose
EMU-induced policies. "The National Front accuses the French elite of
sacrificing French identity for the sake of European integration, while
on the left the. . . Communists" also oppose EMU. " 3 In Italy, a vir-
tual prerequisite to EMU is massive spending cuts and privatizations
of large chunks of the public sector. The government would, in doing
so, quite literally be putting itself out of a job, all in the name of
Maastricht and monetary union.""
2. Skepticism About the Democratic Basis of Maastricht
If the potential political fallout from a perceived loss of monetary
sovereignty does not bode well for monetary union under Maastricht,
then concerns that the Treaty lacks a democratic basis may spell cer-
tain doom for it. Students of European Union law are aware of the
"Democracy Deficit" that plagues E.U. institutions.' With the ad-
109. European Union: Crisis Revives Controversy Between Federalists and Union-
ists, EUR. REP., Oct. 2, 1993, No. 1890.
110. Germany, France and the Merry-Go-Round, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1993, at
49.
111. Riding, supra note 103.
112. Kartos, supra note 78, at 673. Possibly 45 percent of Swedes now oppose full
E.U. membership, while only 14 percent opposed entry at the time Sweden's mem-
bership application was submitted. Id.
113. Muehring, supra note 99, at 37.
114. Id.
115. For a description of the Democracy Deficit, see J.H.H. Weiler, The Transfor-
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vance of a politically independent ECB, this Deficit may also come to
plague the ideal of E.U. level monetary policy-making."' Further-
more, Europeans increasingly see politicians and bureaucrats as oper-
ating on a double standard, telling their constituencies that they will
not pursue monetary union if it is not in the national best interest,
while pressing relentlessly for further union behind closed doors.
A stinging criticism of Maastricht is that it will add an unbear-
able burden to the regulations and costs of the E.U., at a time when
competitiveness is declining and unemployment is rising. The Treaty
does not, according to Lord Rees-Mogg, "square well with the real
Europe." 1 7 Similar anti-EMU cries were heard from business leaders,
most strikingly from ones who were pro-EMU not long ago.'
An even sharper criticism is that the public feels that it has been
mislead over the years by politicians who made clear promises not to
relinquish national monetary sovereignty, even as they were "system-
atically undermining it."" 9 Although the process of European inte-
gration is often described as enjoying broad popular support,"2 recent
mation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2466-74 (1991). This article describes the
Democracy Deficit as the ability of the unelected branches of the E.U., the Commis-
sion and the Council, to pass legislation usurping laws passed by national parlia-
ments, as well as the comparative lack of political power in the only elected E.U.
body, the European Parliament. See also EUROPEAN BANKING, supra note 15, at 1-9;
John Ardagh, Will the New Europe Please Sit Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at
42 (describing the power of Jacques Delors, the unelected President of the European
Commission, as "equal" to that of the twelve heads of Europe who appointed him).
116. See Mullineux, supra note 15, at 1-9. A second Inter-Governmental Confer-
ence was convened in December 1990 to discuss this issue, i.e., who should appoint
the board of the independent ESCB and to whom it should be accountable.
117. William Rees-Mogg, At the Unhealthy Heart of Europe, THE TIMES (London),
Monday June 14, 1993, at 16.
118. Muehring, supra note 99, at 37.
119. Margot Norman, We Are Good Europeans After All, THE TIMES (London),
Sept. 21, 1993, at Features section. In Europe, there has not been any serious
defense of economic nationalism since the collapse of Bretton Woods. Instead, gov-
ernments, at least in Britain, have pushed constantly for integration. Bill Jamieson,
Economic Agenda: Britain: The Lesson of our History, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, May 23,
1993, at 40.
120. Newspapers report that at the start of 1993 there was a growing feeling
that monetary union was well on course. See, e.g., John Palmer, Advocates of EMU
Take Heart From Germany's Economic Problems, GUARDIAN CITY PAGE, Jan. 28,
1993, at 13. These accounts describe statements by politicians that imply solid
support for EMU. For example, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany was reported as
saying that an accelerated schedule for EMU "was needed in part to prevent 'any
slowing down in the timetable for EMU.' Id.
Commentators also described Maastricht as being well on course politically.
For example, "[i]f a member state withdraws from the EMS, [it suggests] a step
back from the process of European integration - a process that, by the 1980's, had
acquired broad popular appeal." GOODMAN, supra note 15, at 200. Two economists
observed that "membership in the EMS has been invested with enormous political
importance at the very highest levels of government." Id., quoting Jeffrey Sachs &
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events cast serious doubt upon this view. The E.U. is now realizing
that politicians have taken voter support for Maastricht for grant-
ed."' In Germany, for example, polls indicate that "[miost ordinary
Germans... are furious at not being consulted about Maastricht in a
referendum similar to the ones held in France, Denmark and Ireland.
Faced with the choice, as they see it, of keeping the German economy
afloat or keeping European idealism afloat, German interests clearly
win out."'22
At the extreme, this sentiment has given rise to the notion that
officials and ministers in both national governments and in the E.U.
actively conspired to say one thing to their people and another thing to
each other."2 "Governments in Europe are paying the price of a lack
of open government and democratic debate on their European poli-
cies, "24 seen by some as a fatal defect in Maastricht. Lord Rees-Mogg
stated that "[tihe strange thing about the Maastricht treaty - and one
of its greatest weaknesses - is that it will remove the control of Euro-
pean economic policy from the European national parliaments and
transfer power to non-elected European bodies, particularly the Euro-
pean central bank."'25 The German high court, in allowing Germany
to sign Maastricht, observed that
[iut is of decisive importance that the democratic basis of union
should keep pace with integration and that a vital democracy
should be maintained as the integration ... continues.126
3. Current Downturns in the European Economy and the
Reemergence of Nationalism.
European politicians and intellectuals who favor EMU suggest
that the long period of relative prosperity during the Cold War has
made Europeans unwilling to pull together and face the challenges of
the future.'27 Europeans place their own well-being ahead of utopian
Charles Wyplosz, The Economic Consequences of President Mitterand, in ECONOMIC
POLICY 2, 294-95 (1986). Such descriptions cannot be viewed as embodying the senti-
ment of most European voters today.
121. The theme of a recent international conference held by an organization called
the "Europeaum" was that "[wlith the exception of Britain, governments and admin-
istrators of the member states, spurred on by the Commission in Brussels, have
acted alone, taking for granted the commitment to Europe of their peoples." Norman,
supra note 119 (quoting Professor Jean Chariot).
122. Gumbel, supra note 68, at A10.
123. "[The conspiracy among officials and ministers to say one thing to each oth-
er and another to their national publics was so close to second nature that the
problem of public consent was taken for granted." Norman, supra note 119 (quoting
William Wallace).
124. Id. (quoting Professor Jean Chariot).
125. Rees-Mogg, supra note 117.
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127. See Craig R. Whitney, Western Europe's Dreams Turning to Nightmares, N.Y.
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aims, especially in this worldwide recession.
[P]rosperity-a basic underpinning of the European [Union] since
its founding in 1957 and, some believe now, the main one-is
threatened in Western Europe.'
EMU is a receding goal, as people worry more and more about unem-
ployment and economic uncertainty."
More ominous has been the reemergence of violent extremism in
Europe. Resentment against refugees pouring into Western Europe,
mostly into Germany, has been part of this problem.1 " The war in
the Balkans, although not directly involving the members of the E.U.,
has been another part. A recurring sentiment is that "Europe is dying
in Sarajevo."131 Increasingly violent nationalism in Europe is slowly
dashing the dreams of a "United States of Europe" once articulated by
Winston Churchill. One of the dreams, whose embers are fading fast
and may never be reignited, is monetary union.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that as European governments and E.U. leaders contin-
ue to push for monetary union,132 they are meeting increasing, per-
haps overwhelming, resistance from their courts and constituencies.
Ideas about the degree of central bank independence in such a union
remain controversial. Whether motivated by economic woes or nation-
alistic urges, Europeans do not have unification and integration on
their minds. Their leaders have been slow in getting this message and
astonished by the prevailing animosity to further union."m These
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at Al.
128. Id.
129. Ray Moseley, Dream of European Unity Fractured by Tough Times, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 15, 1993, at Cl.
130. See, e.g., Whitney, supra note 127. This is perhaps best exemplified by neo-
Nazi violence in Germany.
131. See, e.g., id. (reporting that these words appeared on a poster in Bonn's
market square); Thousands Demonstrate in Barcelona for Peace in Bosnia, AGENCE
FR. PRESSE, Nov. 28, 1993 (reporting that these words were on a banner carried
among a group of some 14,000 protesters).
132. The European Commission last year was enthusiastic of a "fast track to
EMU" idea, which was supported by the governments of Germany, Italy, Spain,
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133. "Former French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet calls the decision [in
late summer 19931 to allow wider currency fluctuations a 'devastating' political
setback to European leaders. The two men who invented the exchange-rate system
back in 1979, former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and former West
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, assailed the decision as "a de facto suspension"
of the monetary system that 'is evidently in contradiction' with the European
Union's goal of a single European currency by the end of the decade." Lawrence
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leaders are, accordingly, changing their expectations about the future
of Maastricht. 34
Economists and commentators had predicted a smooth ride for
monetary integration. Grand ideas of a single European currency, the
ECU, were popular."3 Just prior to the current challenges to
Maastricht, however, one observer ironically cautioned that "an eco-
nomic recession of serious magnitude could provoke a resurgence of
nationalism and, with it, a reimposition of capital and trade con-
trols.""' What had been forgotten or taken for granted in all of these
expectations was the strain that monetary unification efforts would
put on the assumptions that unification makes about national sover-
eignty.
There is an optimistic view that Maastricht's provisions on mone-
tary union can be saved through revisions. One American financier
sees hope in reconstituting the ERM by letting the Deutschmark float,
while pegging the rest of the currencies to the franc. This would allow
Germany time to bring its deficit under control and thereby control its
inflation.137 Former Bundesbank President Karl Otto Poehl said, "I
continue to believe that the way to deal with actual or potential in-
stability of exchange rates is through close co-operation between cen-
tral banks." " The current pessimism toward monetary union could
well be "the child of recession," and evaporate when times get bet-
ter.
139
Any revision to the Treaty in order to preserve its viability, how-
ever, would have to be a protocol instead of an outright amendment.
"Such a protocol is now the only means of closing the gap between
European elites and popular opinion." 4°Even the European Commis-
sion, whose President Jacques Delors has fervently sought monetary
union, has conceded that the Maastricht timetable for EMU will be de-
layed.""
The prevailing view is not optimistic; it is instead that
134. "British Prime Minister John Major, a critic of the exchange-rate mechanism,
said the timetable for economic and monetary union now looks 'totally unrealistic."
Id.
135. This attitude was captured in expressions such as this: "The ECU may soon
become an international reserve currency to rival the U.S. dollar and Japanese yen."
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"Maastricht is dead."142 Britain and other Union members want a
common market and little else.'" One observer has even stated that
"[tihe idea of a United States of Europe is dead, at least in this genera-
tion, and maybe forever. " 144 With legal and political obstacles to
Maastricht having been set, it is not clear what sort of monetary re-
gime will emerge in Europe. It is unlikely, given its strong desire to
maintain the common market, the European Union will revert back to
floating exchange rates.'" It is just as unlikely the E.U. will move
beyond mere policy coordination soon, despite Maastricht.
The primacy of national monetary sovereignty, in any event, has
been reaffirmed for the time being. British Chancellor of the Exche-
quer Kenneth Clarke said recently, "[Charles] de Gaulle has been
proved right about the importance of sovereignty."14 The idea that
nations are sovereign over their money, which has until now been
taken as a descriptive statement subject to revision, has taken on a
distinctly normative quality in Europe's Maastricht experience. 47
If the road toward monetary union in Europe is viewed
paradigmatically, then monetary sovereignty will become, contrary to
expectations, an even more important variable as the world economy
continues to integrate. Other countries, even those that do not consider
EMU to be an appropriate model, will not be able to ignore the events
that have unfolded in the European Union.
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